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In this article, I seek to critically examine unconditional 
cash transfers (UCTs) and conditional cash transfers (CCTs) 
and consider how a Levinasian ethics might offer normative 
guidelines to evaluate such aid programmes. Such an analysis 
will serve to both critique and supplement the traditional 
utilitarian analyses of such programmes. In so doing, this 
article also hopes to contribute to the business ethics literature 
in which a Levinasian ethics may be brought to bear on real‑
world problems. I argue that this can be done by allowing a 
more complex representation of the Other’s alterity. Two UCT 
programmes are then examined using this framework.
1. Introduction
The old adage has it that beggars can’t be choosers. The 
one who proffers alms is the one who chooses the form that 
help will take. For the beggar to protest an offering, however 
small or unsuitable, is to display an unforgivable ingratitude. 
The poor would seem to fall into this category: although 
they are not always the desperate supplicant soliciting with 
outstretched hand, they need help, and there are plenty of 
NGOs and charities willing to assist. Those driving poverty 
alleviation believe that certain initiatives will be more effective 
than others at achieving this goal. Some advocate, and get 
donors to back, sanitation infrastructure projects as a means to 
overcome poverty (see Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 2018), 
while others believe that improving adult literacy rates 
achieves better outcomes (see Project Literacy, 2018). Experts 
thus prescribe how the poor will be helped after careful 
consideration of how much impact a particular intervention will 
deliver over a particular time frame. 
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Such a cost‑benefit analysis fits well with a utilitarian1 ethics, where one aid intervention 
is  preferred over another because it leads to more desirable consequences.2 However, 
I  will argue in this article that using only utilitarianism to evaluate aid programmes 
leaves something of ethical importance out – the ethical singularity of the Other. 
Furthermore, in some instances, cost‑benefit outcomes are ambiguous in determining 
which aid interventions are ‘better’ precisely because their utility cannot be objectively 
determined. Based on this ambiguity, funders may decide to shelve an aid programme. 
In this article, I examine two particular aid interventions – UCT (unconditional cash 
transfer) and CCT (conditional cash transfer) programmes in light of these concerns. 
My analysis seeks to position CCT and UCT programmes beyond just understanding 
them as mere positive cost‑benefit outcomes, and so, “remind us of our unfinished 
responsibility” (Jordaan, 2009:98) towards the poor. I will enlist the ethics of Emmanuel 
Levinas to interrogate UCT and CCT aid interventions which will aim at critiquing and 
supplementing the traditional utilitarian analysis used to evaluate such programmes. 
In one of Emmanuel Levinas’s interviews he remarks that: “My task does not consist in 
constructing ethics; I only try to find its meaning” (1985:90). Levinas, therefore, does 
not seek to define a particular system of ethics, or provide a set of normative guidelines 
but rather, the essence of the ethical relation in general; what Simon Critchley (1999:3) 
has called the “primordial ethical experience”. Frustratingly, Levinas offers us few 
concrete examples of such a primordial ethical experience (what he calls the face‑to‑
face encounter) beyond the everyday and common gestures that involve us saying, in 
recognition of the Other, ‘After you, Sir’ (1998:117). 
While Levinas’s caution that he does not seek to construct ethics is perhaps one of 
the most quoted lines in the Levinasian literature, less often repeated is the immediate 
follow‑up remark he offers: “one can without doubt construct an ethics in function of 
what I have just said, but this is not my own theme” (1985:90). As such, Levinas leaves 
the door open to normative approaches that seek to build upon his ‘ethics of ethics’ 
(Derrida, 1978:111). However, if such an enterprise is fraught with difficulty – because 
Levinas offers us very little guidance on how to proceed – it is doubly so when considered 
within a business or organisational context. Paper after paper within the literature 
contains the implicit, and not so implicit warning that using Levinas as a framework 
to interrogate business or organisational ethics themes should proceed with extreme 
caution and care lest Levinas’s project be misconstrued or subverted.
Karamali (2007:317) argues that reducing Levinas’s ‘strangeness’ in order that he may 
help us “write about business ethics in a way that might make a difference […] will 
always involve a homogenisation of his thought”. Bevan and Corvellecc flatly deny that a 
Levinasian ‘corporate ethics’ is possible, while even the Levinasian managerial ethics they 
posit instead proceeds with a “tentative tone” and which is “propositional, rather than 
assertively normative” (2007:11). Introna (2007:271) warns that “Levinas’s ethics cannot 
solve cases” and that any attempt to “apply” Levinas risks “enter[ing] into the economy 
of the category and the instance to be covered by the category” – the very thing Levinas 
criticises as a “totalising” of the Other. Similarly, Forstorp (2007:300) argues that “applied 
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ethics” as an example of the totalising tendencies inherent in philosophy go against the 
Levinasian grain, especially within business (and business ethics) which, more than most 
social practices, exemplify the “potential reduction of the other to the same”. 
Forstorp (2007:300) continues by arguing that in spite of the seemingly unlikely context 
of business or organisational ethics in which to consider the “ethical reasoning of 
Levinas”, there are nonetheless opportunities for doing so. This is borne out by several 
attempts within the business ethics and organisation studies literature and which span a 
broad context, for example: software piracy (Introna, 2007), marketing (Desmond, 2007), 
corporate governance (Mansell, 2008), health care tenders (McMurray, Pullen & 
Rhodes, 2010), human resource management (Dale, 2012), fair trade (Staricco, 2016), and 
more pertinent to this article’s topic, fundraising (Forstorp, 2007). 
While this article’s main contribution lies in a rethinking of UCT and CCT programmes, 
an ancillary (though important) contribution to the business ethics and organisational 
studies literature is how a Levinasian understanding of ethics may be brought to bear, 
albeit imperfectly, on real‑world problems. By ‘constructing’ a Levinasian ethics – that 
is, moving beyond determining ethics’ meaning – l hope to offer a positive account on 
how to proceed in using Levinas’s ideas to address practical organisational issues and 
not just add to the list of proscriptions alluded to above. So, for example, I will argue 
that a Levinasian framework allows one to place an ethical value on non‑quantifiable 
and immeasurable utility such as spiritual well‑being in order to advocate one course of 
action rather than another.
The article proceeds as follows: In the following section, the place of CCT and UCT 
aid programmes in addressing poverty is examined. Thereafter, the ethics of Emmanuel 
Levinas is introduced – how the Other as “exteriority” leads to an infinite responsibility 
to and for the Other. This is followed by an explication of Levinas’s notion of the “third”, 
and how it allows distributive justice, or politics, to enter and restore balance to the 
asymmetrical ethical relation. I will then follow Jordaan (2009) in arguing that one 
way in which a ‘Levinasian ethical politics’ can be instantiated in practice is through 
institutional designs that attempt the representation of the (poor and marginalised) 
other in as complex and nuanced a manner as possible. This prescription will then frame 
the Levinasian evaluation of two UCT/CCT programmes in the final section.
2.  Addressing poverty: conditional and unconditional  
cash transfers 
Assessing which aid projects will be the most cost‑effective in addressing a particular 
aspect of poverty alleviation, as well as the subsequent monitoring and evaluation of 
that project, requires resources. Managing an aid programme will necessarily divert 
money away from the intended beneficiaries of that poverty‑alleviation intervention 
(GiveWell,  2018). Partly as a response to this, governments in the early 2000s started 
giving poor households cash stipends to spend as they saw fit. These cash transfers, 
called CCTs, were however, subject to certain conditions being met, the most common 
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being ensuring that children were enrolled in school (Fiszbein & Schady, 2009). These 
conditions aimed to support the realisation of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) (UN,  2018), in particular the second MDG which strives to ensure universal 
primary schooling for all citizens around the world. The largest and best known of these 
CCT programmes, Bolsa Familia, operating in Brazil, pioneered the CCT wave, and 
by the end of the first decade of the 21st century, over 37 developing countries had 
implemented a form of CCT programme (Grosh et al., 2011, in Baird, Ferreira, Özler & 
Woolcock, 2013:11) as a means to lift their citizens out of poverty. Impact studies have 
shown that CCTs have, in general, reduced poverty levels by providing a steady stream 
of income. CCTs have increased school enrolment and also visits to health providers for 
preventive check‑ups and immunisations (Fiszbein & Schady, 2009). 
Monitoring the conditions attached to the CCTs, by a means‑ or proxy‑means test, 
however, still diverts financial and other resources away from the beneficiaries of the 
poverty‑alleviation interventions, albeit considerably less so than traditional forms of 
aid. Mitigating this diversion of resources even further led to the idea of unconditional 
cash transfers (UCTs) being mooted, and UCT programmes initiated. Give Directly, an 
NGO operating in Kenya and Uganda, gives extremely poor recipients $1 000, which is 
approximately a year’s budget for a typical household in Kenya, directly (via M‑Pesa, 
an electronic payment system accessed on cellular phones) to spend as they wish (Give 
Directly, 2018). 
“The main argument for UCTs is that the key constraint for poor people is simply lack of 
money, not knowledge, and thus they are best equipped to decide what to do with the 
cash” (Hanlon, Barrientos & Hulme, 2010, in Baird et al., 2013:10). Thus, a poor family 
may decide that what they need most, to raise their standard of living, is to replace their 
thatch roof with a tin roof. A thatch roof is leaky and needs to be replaced twice a year 
(The Economist, 2013). Replacing the roof is thus not merely an aesthetic intervention but 
because a leaky roof is also more likely to be a vector of disease, replacing it is likely to 
improve health outcomes. Furthermore, as the roof does not have to be replaced as often, 
the money saved can be used to start a small business, selling chickens, for example. 
The resulting income stream can in turn be used to send one or more of the household’s 
children to primary school. 
Since the launch of UCT programmes, several studies have been conducted to determine 
whether UCTs are more, or less effective than CCTs in achieving certain outcomes, in 
particular, educational outcomes. A report by Sarah Baird and her colleagues (2013) which 
analysed data from 26 CCTs, five UCTs and four programmes that ran CCTs and UCTs 
in parallel, concluded that in general there is no significant difference between CCTs 
and UCTs in raising school enrolment and attendance. However, refining the categories 
further revealed that “programs that are explicitly conditional, monitor compliance and 
penalize non‑compliance have substantively larger effects (60% improvement in odds of 
enrolment)” (2013:8). One of the studies cited in the report above concerned a joint UCT/
CCT programme in Malawi that focused not just on schooling but also on marriage and 
fertility outcomes. Baird, McIntosh and Özler (2011) discovered that although CCTs were 
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more cost effective than UCTs in raising school enrolment and attendance, UCTs were 
much more effective in reducing teenage pregnancies and marriage (thus increasing the 
likelihood that they would not drop out and would complete their schooling). 
The upshot of these empirical studies then, is that cost‑benefit analyses to determine 
whether UCTs or CCTs are better aid interventions, remain inconclusive. That is to say, 
utilitarianism, as an ethical strategy to evaluate UCTs against CCTs falls short in certain 
respects. Part of the reason for this is that the moral calculus required of utilitarianism 
in order to pronounce on a preference depends on a reductionist aggregation of those 
affected as well as the purported utility that results from any one aid intervention. The 
utility arising from the aid interventions above are cashed out as either raising school 
enrolment and attendance or reducing teenage pregnancy; so, the programmes determine 
from the outset what utility they are looking for and thus will measure. In other words, a 
utilitarian evaluation assumes that it can objectively declare that one outcome is better 
than another because a particular outcome produces more utility. However, it is a utility 
it has already pre‑defined in claiming that reducing teenage pregnancy is more valuable 
than raising school enrolment (or vice versa, or by using different criteria). But who 
determines this? Certain outcomes are privileged and then imposed upon those targeted 
for assistance, regardless of whether those outcomes are desired by the recipients 
themselves. Or, couched in utilitarian terms, the recipients of aid have no, or little, say 
in what they believe is more valuable – reduced teenage pregnancy or raised school 
enrolment – and thus produces greater utility for them. 
The above points can be tied to the notion of marginal utility which often operates in 
step with utilitarianism. Marginal utility requires us to give up until “the level at which, 
by giving more, I would cause as much suffering to myself or my dependants as I would 
receive by my gift” (Singer, 1972:241). While this is a morally demanding standard, we 
can, once this level is reached, justifiably claim that we have discharged our ethical 
obligations to the poor. This is because the determination of what response, or level 
of giving is required (the level at which marginal utility kicks in) is dependent on a 
particular representation of the target of our giving (and a concomitant representation 
of their needs) which, I have argued, involves a reductionist aggregation of their ethical 
subjectivity.3 Marginal utility forecloses a wider representation of the Other and needs of 
the Other. A utilitarian evaluation of aid programmes will thus always leave something 
of ethical importance out. As a first approximation, what that something is can broadly 
be described as the recognition of the ethical singularity of the Other, which resists his/
her reduction into a moral aggregation. Part of the reason utilitarianism ignores ethical 
singularity can be traced back to the previous paragraph’s claim that utilitarianism 
maintains the fiction that value and/or utility can be objectively determined. 
In order to develop this argument and then apply it to two UCT case studies, I offer a 
brief explication of Levinas’s ethics. The first case study is based on a blogger’s report of 
an Oxfam UCT aid intervention in Vietnam, while the second is based on an academic 
paper published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics concerning a joint UCT/CCT aid 
intervention in Malawi. The differing formality of these sources will inform the depth 
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of analysis I offer in each case. The first case, being based on a blog, will rely more on 
description than analysis. This will serve to frame the more systematic analysis I offer in 
the second case, and which is based on a scientific study. The case studies will also serve 
to further illustrate how CCTs and UCTs operate and differ from one another. 
2.1 Levinasian ethics
In Totality and Infinity, Emmanuel Levinas (1969:43) defines ethics as “the calling into 
question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other”. What Levinas means is that 
when we encounter the Other, face‑to‑face (and the face has a specific meaning for 
Levinas which I will get to shortly), it is not a simple engagement which I, as a supposedly 
rational and autonomous subject, have control over (Jones, 2003:227). Levinas claims that 
our subjectivity is held ‘hostage’ by the Other (1998:117). Furthermore, the relationship 
that is established between myself and the Other in this encounter is non‑reciprocal and 
asymmetrical.
The reason for this, simply put, is that the Other is ‘strange’ (1969:43), that is, the Other 
is singular and hence unknowable. The Other is not merely different, her ‘otherness’ is an 
alterity – alterity is not “a dialectical opposition to the other [… nor] the simple reverse of 
identity, and is not formed out of resistance to the same, but is prior to every initiative, to 
all imperialism of the same” (1969:38). The ‘imperialism of the same’ should be understood 
as a totalising ontology which, in attempting to know the Other, reduces the Other to its 
same such that there is no Being exterior to it. The alterity of the Other is prior to this 
‘imperialism of the same’ and thus Levinas argues that metaphysics precedes ontology 
(1969:43). By metaphysics, Levinas simply means ethics and by ontology Levinas means 
all totalising systems of knowledge and representation. In summary, Levinas argues for 
“ethics as first philosophy”.
How then can the Other, who is exterior to all systems and modes of representation, be 
represented? Levinas’s solution is to adapt the idea of infinity as analysed by Descartes 
in his Third Meditation (1969:48‑52). The idea of infinity as an idea whose content exceeds 
its concept (or more technically stated, as that which is surpassed by its ideatum) 
becomes the model for the representation of the Other. The other presents himself as 
“the exceeding of the idea of the other in me” (1969:50). Levinas calls this way of the 
Other’s presenting itself ‘face’. Perpich (2008:69) describes what the face represents: it 
“represents the inadequacy of every image to the task of representing the other and, as 
such, paradoxically, represents the impossibility of its own representational activity”.
The face can the thus signify the needs and suffering of the Other, because, as Levinas 
explains, “access to the face is straightaway ethical” (1985:85). The needs and suffering 
of the Other do not need to traverse ontological categories, such as ‘moral reasons for 
action’ because the face is “an imperative given to your responsibility: to encounter a face 
is straightaway to hear a demand and an order” (Levinas, 2001:48). In summary, Levinas’s 
central argument is that because the Other is unrepresentable; or rather, because only 
the Other, as face, can present himself (as unrepresentable) I cannot discharge my 
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responsibilities to him. Otherwise put – because I can never be sure that what I have 
responded to is the true demand of the Other I can never discharge my responsibility to 
him, thus my responsibility to the Other is infinite. 
The asymmetry of the face‑to‑face encounter is the asymmetry of representation –
only the Other can represent himself, I can never do so and so only I can be infinitely 
responsible. Levinas (1985:99) claims that “I am responsible for a total responsibility, 
which answers for all the others and for all in the others, even for their responsibility. 
The I always has one responsibility more than all the others.” 
At this stage, we are bound to wonder that if I am infinitely responsible to the Other 
what is there left for me, or any other others? Levinas outlines the way out of this 
quandary, answering that if the Other “were my interlocutor I would have had nothing 
but obligations! But I don’t live in a world in which there is but one single ‘first comer’; 
there is always a third party in the world: he or she is also my other, my fellow.” The third 
then, in the words of Alford (2004:156), “saves us from being consumed by the infinite 
need of the other”. Levinas (1998:104) continues delineating the impact of the third: 
“Hence, it is important to me to know which of the two takes precedence […] must not 
human beings, who are incomparable, be compared? Thus, justice here, takes precedence 
over the taking upon oneself of the fate of the other.”
Justice is for Levinas “something which is a calculation, which is knowledge, and 
which supposes politics; it is inseparable from the political. It is something which [he] 
distinguishes from ethics, which is primary” (1998:171). So, while the face of the Other 
holds my subjectivity hostage, Simon Critchley (2012:57) notes that “autonomy [and 
symmetry] comes back into the picture for Levinas at the level of another demand, 
namely the demand for justice, the just society and everything that he gathers under 
the heading of  ‘the third party’”. The third therefore, marks the movement from ethics to 
politics in Levinas’s work. 
2.2 Levinasian politics 
The third marks the beginning of the attempt to contain the radical demand of an infinite 
ethical responsibility within a finite political existence. However, the third party does 
not arrive after the Other: “[W]e cannot speak of the Other without immediately and 
simultaneously speaking of all Others …” (Introna, 2007:267). Jordaan (2009:97) describes 
how the third is both another Other to me, but also, at the same time, the third is an 
Other to that Other; so that “I am not to commit myself to one other at the expense of 
all Others. In order to be just, I have to limit my responsibility to the specific other and 
divide it amongst numerous others.” 
The third thus introduces notions of equality “as the self divides its responsibility, and of 
politics as competition emerges over how equality should be interpreted and responsibility 
should be apportioned” (Jordaan, 2009:86). Distributive justice, or politics, introduced by 
the arrival of the third, is thus not a ‘superimposition’ (Alford, 2004:156) on the original 
face‑to‑face, encounter but rather, the mechanism whereby the ethical demand of the 
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Other and the Other Others can be responded to. The third, argues Levinas (1998:157), 
“is of itself the limit of responsibility and the birth of the question: What do I have to 
do with justice?” Justice, or politics as the limit of responsibility does not imply “ethics 
[as] necessarily a restraint on power – i.e. one where politics comes first and then ethics 
evaluates it later – [rather] politics is the machinery through which the ethical demand 
can be responded to” (McMurray et al., 2010:546).
How might this machinery, which Jordaan (2009:100) calls a Levinasian ethical politics, 
work in practice? Jordaan offers a very simple prescription with which to operationalise 
Levinas’s ethics: convey the alterity of the Other in greater complexity by presenting a 
fuller and more nuanced representation of the Other (ibid.). While “general institutional 
and theoretical designs”, such as CCT and UCT poverty alleviation schemes, must 
necessarily supress “other’s otherness”, this “is tolerable as long as this otherness is not 
lost sight of, for it is the otherness of the other, his face, that reminds us of our unfinished 
responsibility for him and the incompleteness of justice” (ibid.). 
I intend to examine two UCT case studies below which attempt to illustrate, in a 
concrete manner, how the otherness of the Other is not lost sight of. In so doing, I hope 
to demonstrate not only how a Levinasian ethics might offer normative guidelines to 
evaluate aid programmes so considered; but also how such guidelines might improve aid 
intervention practice insofar as cost‑benefit (utilitarian) analyses do not always provide 
sufficient ethical motivation for their existence, continuation or adaptation. 
2.3 Two UCT case studies
Two UCT programmes, one set in south‑east Asia, the Other in southern Africa, will be 
interrogated to determine how far the intervention succeeds in not losing sight of the 
‘other’s otherness’, and thus remaining more faithful to Levinas’s injunction to respect 
the alterity of the Other manifested in the face‑to‑face encounter.
2.3.1 A UCT programme in Vietnam
The first, initiated in 2006, involved once‑off, unconditional cash grants by a British aid 
organisation, Oxfam, to 550 households in a poor community on the central coast of 
Vietnam. Two years later, the intervention was deemed a success, with local poverty 
rates down by 20%, declining dropout rates at schools and increased female participation 
in the community. 
My interest in the intervention, however, arises from the arresting moniker given to 
the project – ‘cash for coffins’ – by an Oxfam blogger, Duncan Greer (2009). Several 
elderly recipients chose to spend their UCTs on funeral arrangements by investing in 
coffins and family tombs. Greer describes that although this type of spending was not 
the target of the project – coffins and tombs are not productive assets – “there is an 
inextricable link between people’s spirituality and their physiological well‑being that 
cannot be discounted”. This had long‑term significance to the beneficiaries’ lives, and 
they mentioned this to the fieldworkers on several occasions. 
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Most people have a spiritual dimension and addressing this is not usually considered 
in aid interventions. Concerns about burying the dead only materialise after a natural 
catastrophe, such as an earthquake, has occurred, or a contagious epidemic, such as 
Ebola, has ravaged a community. In the event, burying the dead becomes a public health 
issue, not a means to honour the dead. The aid workers are concerned with cadavers, not 
the representatives of a religious afterlife. Subject to a cost‑benefit analysis, spending 
limited aid resources on coffins and tombs is politically unjustifiable – there are no 
substantial ‘multiplier effects’, as economists call them (discounting the economic 
demand stimulated by the manufacturers and sellers of coffins and tombs), the money 
literally goes into the ground. 
The project can be said to embody distributive justice when the otherness of the 
Vietnamese community is represented as gendered Other, uneducated Other and 
poor Other, which correspond to the increased female participation in the community, 
decrease in local poverty rates and school dropout rates respectively. However, if the 
project had not been structured as a UCT, but as a CCT – the conditions specifically 
being tied to spending the cash transfer only on measures to achieve higher incomes 
and female participation as well as lowering school dropout rates – then the spiritual 
Other would have been ignored. The project as a CCT would have, in Levinasian terms, 
“totalised” the otherness of the Vietnamese community into a three‑fold representation. 
As such, the project would have been less faithful to a Levinasian ethical understanding, 
because more of the otherness of the Vietnamese community would have been lost. 
The increased physiological well‑being and significance reported by the beneficiaries, as 
a result of being able to purchase coffins and tombs, should thus not be viewed as just 
an unexpected benefit of the project. Such increased well‑being represents an ethical 
surplus not captured in the cost‑benefit analysis of the project. I would venture that the 
increased female participation in the community and decreased school dropout rates 
flow in part from such increased well‑being which at the very minimum encourages 
more engagement with others. In other words, the cost‑benefit evaluation of the UCT 
may well have the source of causation back to front. Furthermore, while this UCT 
delivered an unambiguous positive result in terms of successful outcomes sought by 
the funders of the project, this might not have been the case. (The case study to follow 
results in ambiguous outcomes.) In that instance, a Levinasian evaluation of the project, 
understood as a matter of not losing sight of the Other’s otherness, would still result 
in an ethical affirmation of the project. This in turn might persuade the funders of the 
project to refine the outcomes sought and thus not abandon a marginal community. 
While the notion of an infinite responsibility towards the Other is not brought to bear on 
the present case, the problem of how the Other is represented is. However, the problem 
of representation, or how to represent the ethical demand of the Other, is what leads to 
an infinite responsibility for the Other: we always have one more responsibility to the 
Other. In the present case, that responsibility is to the Other represented as a spiritual 
other. And while the addition of a spiritual representation of the Vietnamese other does 
not exhaust the alterity of the Vietnamese other, it does represent the alterity of the 
Vietnamese other in a more nuanced and fuller manner. 
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2.3.2 A Joint CCT/UCT programme in Malawi
The second aid intervention to be interrogated concerns a joint CCT/UCT programme 
targeting adolescent girls in the Zomba district of Malawi, designed specifically to 
test the efficacy of conditionality to achieve certain outcomes – school enrolment, test 
scores, teenage pregnancy and marriage rates (Baird et al., 2011). The CCT arm of the 
project was made conditional on school attendance, while the UCT arm saw the cash 
transfer being divided between the school‑age girl and her parents ($4 to the parents, 
$1 to the schoolgirl).4 
After running the project for two years, the results showed that the CCTs were more 
cost‑effective than UCTs in increasing school enrolment and attendance but had little 
effect in reducing teenage pregnancy or marriage in that cohort. However, teenage 
pregnancy and marriage rates were considerably lower (by 27% and 44% respectively) in 
the UCT arm than the CCT arm. Interestingly, these impacts in the UCT arm resulted 
almost entirely from those schoolgirls who had dropped out of school after the start of 
the intervention. The authors of the study postulate that this reduction in marriage and 
pregnancy rates in the UCT arm “seems consistent with the idea that adolescent girls 
who drop out of school undergo a rapid transition into adulthood that is also strongly 
influenced by economic circumstances” (Baird et al., 2011:1748). In other words, the 
continued income received by the UCT recipient (because the grant is not conditional 
upon school attendance) allows her to postpone marriage and/or pregnancy because 
of poverty, even as her dropping out of school would usually increase this risk. The 
authors report that 25% of the sexually active girls in the study had initiated their sexual 
relationships because they ‘wanted gifts/money’ or needed ‘his financial assistance’ and 
therefore that decisions regarding sexual behaviour and marriage amongst adolescent 
girls are influenced by poverty (ibid.). The authors (p. 1740) conclude that their counter‑
intuitive result of reduced pregnancy and marriage rates in the UCT arm are because 
“the schooling channel on marriage operates through the dropouts averted by the CCT 
arm, while the income effect on marriage operates through those who dropped out of 
school [the UCT arm]” and that “the latter group is substantially larger than the former” 
in their study.
Discussing the generalisability of their findings, the authors contrast southern and 
eastern Africa with Bangladesh, where school dropout and marriage rates amongst 
adolescent girls are also high because of poverty. While UCTs may be better interventions 
– to reduce teenage pregnancy and marriage in Malawi – CCTs (tied to enrolment) may 
be better in Bangladesh because of dowry payments made from the bride’s family to the 
groom’s (2011:1748‑9).5
Both CCT and UCT arms of the project deliver distributive justice to the beneficiaries, 
that is, both result in positive outcomes for the recipients. However, unlike the previous 
case examined, the cost‑benefit outcomes are ambiguous in determining whether UCTs 
or CCTs are ‘better’ aid interventions. One reason for this is that the utility sought by 
the designers of the joint CCT/UCT programme resists aggregation – an outcome of 
increased school enrolment cannot be reduced to the same outcome which measures 
decreased teenage pregnancy and marriage. If we return to the Levinasian framework 
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presented in this article, the resistance to aggregation arises because the Other seeks 
to maintain his/her singularity when s/he needs to be made comparable with the third 
in order to enact justice. Likewise, an outcome of reduced teenage pregnancy rates 
amongst Malawian schoolgirls cannot be reduced to the same outcome which measures 
this same metric amongst Bangladeshi schoolgirls. Without recourse to a cost‑benefit 
analysis which shows that CCTs deliver increased school enrolments and decreased 
teenage pregnancy rates, or that UCTs deliver decreased teenage pregnancy rates in 
both Malawi and Bangladesh, how will the designers of future UCT or CCT programmes 
argue their case in the context of limited funding resources? My argument is that a 
Levinasian evaluation of the project, understood as a matter of not losing sight of the 
Other’s otherness, would provide the ethical tipping point in favour of a UCT.
I do so by returning to Jordaan’s (2009) prescription which, to recall, questions whether 
the institutional and theoretical designs of the project are tolerable in terms of keeping 
the Levinasian otherness of the Malawian schoolgirls in sight. Although both the 
CCT and UCT arm of the project share specific desired outcomes – increased school 
enrolment and test scores, decreased teenage pregnancy and marriage rates – and thus 
totalise the otherness of the Malawian schoolgirls into those categories, the CCT arm 
supresses the otherness of the Malawian schoolgirls further. The conditionality of school 
attendance represents the girls as vectors of educational outcomes only, while bracketing 
out their roles as contributors to the poor household economy. In the CCT arm the 
schoolgirl measures her contribution primarily in terms of the cash grant her school 
attendance ensures. The burden to ensure the continuance of the cash grant will weigh 
disproportionally in any decision that might result in her missing school. A sick parent 
could place the schoolgirl in the unenviable position of having to choose between nursing 
and tending her parent or going to school to secure the CCT. The CCT, as designed in the 
current project, while offering a ladder to climb out of poverty, offers no net to catch the 
schoolgirl should she fall off that ladder. 
The UCT arm, on the other hand, which continues to be paid even if the schoolgirl has 
dropped out of school, expands the otherness of the schoolgirl by multiplying the choices 
open to her. Baird et al. (2011:1712) cite studies that demonstrate that “increased age at 
first marriage can improve the quality of marriage matches and reduce the likelihood of 
divorce, increase women’s decision‑making power in the household, reduce their chances 
of experiencing domestic violence, and improve health care practices amongst pregnant 
women”. The UCT, by lowering pregnancy rates and delaying marriage, thus increases 
the likelihood that the Other as happy bride, successful spouse, empowered decision 
maker and respected wife will be allowed representation and expression. The UCT also 
mitigates the “rapid transition into adulthood” dropping out of school causes (cited by 
Baird et al. above), allowing the Other‑as‑child to develop more sustainably. 
Evaluating the case through a Levinasian framework thus permits an ethical evaluation 
which favours a UCT. Such an evaluation can be seen as one way to move forward from 
the ethical impasse a utilitarian cost‑benefit analysis produces in the present case. 
A Levinasian framework would mitigate the ethical ambiguity faced by the designers of 
future UCT and CCT aid programmes structured similarly to the one in the present case. 
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4. Conclusion 
This article offered a critical analysis of UCT and CCT aid programmes and sought to 
demonstrate how a Levinasian framework might offer normative guidelines to evaluate 
aid programmes which go beyond just a utilitarian cost‑benefit analysis. In so doing, it 
hopes to contribute to the business ethics and organisational studies literature which 
aims at, inter alia, providing examples of how a Levinasian understanding of ethics may 
be brought to bear, albeit imperfectly, on real‑world problems. While Levinas seeks only 
to find the meaning of ethics, he does so, arguably, in order to change our understanding 
of ethics. Apropos this, Bernasconi (2002:250) argues that “the reorientation of thinking 
that is Levinas’s goal […] matters not at all unless it impacts on our approach to concrete 
situations so that we come to see them as ethical”. I hope to have shown that reorienting 
our thinking about UCT and CCT aid programmes from a Levinasian perspective will 
have an impact on how these aid programmes are evaluated. 
In considering how the otherness of the Other is not lost sight of when designing aid 
programmes, a Levinasian framework might improve aid intervention practice insofar 
as cost‑benefit (utilitarian) analyses do not always provide sufficient ethical motivation 
for their existence, continuation or adaptation. The limitation of this article is that 
it considers only UCT and CCT aid interventions. Further studies could build on the 
Levinasian framework developed in this article in order to supplement the (mostly 
utilitarian) ethical evaluations of other aid programmes. 
Cullity (2004) in The Moral Demands of Affluence argues that one of the worst things 
about being poor is the absence of choices. He laments that “threats to life [seem to] 
exhaust what is bad about extreme poverty […] it is arguable that threats to life are not 
even the worst thing about destitution: what matters more is the way it diminishes the 
quality, rather than merely the duration, of people’s lives” (2004:10). This article started 
with the adage ‘beggars can’t be choosers’. I have argued that the Other, as beggar, as 
poor, as elderly spiritual Vietnamese, as precocious Malawian schoolgirl, must always 
be allowed to choose, if we hope to ensure that the politics of aid remains ethical. 
A Levinasian ethics achieves this because it recognises that the Other can be a chooser, 
or rather, that the Other always has been a chooser. 
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Endnotes
1 Utilitarianism can be distilled into three propositions: (1)  Actions are to be judged right or 
wrong solely by virtue of their consequences. (2)  In assessing consequences, the only criterion 
is the amount of happiness or unhappiness that is created. (3)  Each person’s happiness counts 
the same (Rachels, 2007:100). While such a description of utilitarianism is very simplified – 
it ignores the differences between act and rule utilitarianism, for example – it nonetheless 
suffices for the purposes of this article insofar as it captures utilitarianism’s focus on outcomes 
and moral calculation. 
2 In assessing the effectiveness of aid, aid agencies will typically not employ a deontological 
analysis. As such, this article will steer clear of interrogating Kantianism, as the chief exemplar 
of deontology, as a means to evaluate the wider ethical implications that follow from UCTs. 
Nonetheless, we might ask of an aid intervention whether it, honouring Kantianism, respects 
and furthers the intrinsic worth of the recipients as rational, autonomous human beings, 
regardless of their economic station. Although Kant and Levinas both regard human dignity 
as of supreme value, they approach the matter from polar ends – for Kant, dignity follows from 
my (rational) subjectivity, which is autonomous, whereas for Levinas, dignity follows from 
my subjectivity which emanates from, and is held hostage to, the other (see the section on 
the Levinasian other below). Ultimately, Kantianism, like utilitarianism, also, problematically, 
allows the ethical agent to limit their ethical responsibility towards the Other, and so falls 
victim to a similar critique as that offered here against utilitarianism. 
3 In the terminology to be introduced in the following section, we can say marginal utility is a 
mechanism which assists in reducing the other to the self. 
4 This reallocation of a portion of the UCT from the parent to the schoolgirl was found to have 
no significant impact on the desired outcomes of the project (Baird et al., 2011). 
5 Girls between 15 and 17 years are offered cooking oil on condition that they remain unmarried 
until they are 18; the amount of oil being determined such that it is greater than the cost of 
delaying marriage, which comes in the form of increased dowry payments (Buchmann, Field, 
Glennerster, Nazneen, Pimkina & Sen, 2017).
